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Recent Decisions
Administrative Law - "Equal Time Act" Does Not
Apply To Regular Weathercasts By Political Candidate.
Brigham v. F.C.C., 276 F. 2d 828 (5th Cir. 1960). Peti-
tioner appealed from an F.C.C. ruling that the "equal
time" clause of the Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1959) § 315 (a), as amended by Pub. L.
86-274, § 1, 73 STAT. 557 (19,59), did not apply to daily
broadcasts by a radio-television station's regular weather-
caster who was the political opponent of petitioner -and
who broadcast under the name "TX Weatherman,". The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in affirming the F.C.C.
ruling, held that the weathercaster's appearance was solely
a bona fide effort to present the news and thus exempt from
the "equal time" clause. The Court said that the weather-
caster's employment was not something arising out of the
election, campaign, but rather, a regular job.
The instant case is the first appellate court decision
under the "equal time" clause as amended. Prior to the
1959 amendment, § 315 (a) provided that a licensee who
permitted a legally qualified candidate for any political
office to "use" a broadcasting station must also afford
"equal time" to all other such candidates for that office.
After the F.C.C. ruling in the Lar Daly case, February 19,
1959, that the appearance of a candidate in filmed por-
tions of a television news broadcast was within the purview
of § 315 (a), Congress amended the section to exempt
bona -fide newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries,
and on-the-spot coverage of news events. It thereby nar-
rowed the scope of "use".
In the only previous appellate decision interpreting
"use", the term had been construed to mean "use" by a
candidate himself, and did not include "use" by those
speaking in his behalf. Felix v. Westinghouse Radio
Stations, 186 F. 2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1950), cert. den. 341 U.S.
909 (1951). The legislative history indicates that four
different Senate bills proposing an amendnent to § 315
(a) had contemplated the exempting of panel discussions,
debates, and similar programs. At the core of the amended
section is an attempt to preserve network discretion, but
at the same time to eliminate favoritism and to require
equal treatment of candidates. U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News (1959), 86th Congress, 1st Session, p. 2564. See also
44 Am. Jur., Radio, § 1 et seq.; and 171 A.L.R. 765 (1947).
RECENT DECISIONS
Conflict Of Laws - Alienation of Affections. Albert v.
McGrath, 278 F. 2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1960). Plaintiff brought
suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia to
recover for the alienation of her husband's 'affections, al-
leging that her husband and, defendant engaged in action-
able misconduct in the District of Columbia. Plaintiff and
her husband were residents of Maryland. Since Maryland
has abolished the action for alienation of affections, 7 MD.
CODE (1957) Art. 75C, § 1, recovery had to be in the District
of Columbia where such an action still exists. Trenerry
v. Fravel, 10 F. 2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1926). The District Court
denied recovery, 165 F. Supp. 461 (D.C. D.C. 1958), dis-
cussed in 19 Md. L. Rev. 82 (1959), but the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia reversed and held that
the Maryland statute abolishing alienation of affections
did not preclude a recovery where the defendant resided in
the District of Columbia and where the place of the wrong
was the said District. The Court noted that the Maryland
statute had no extra-territorial effect since it is expressly
limited to acts committed within Maryland. Moreover,
the Court said that the Maryland statute did not preclude
a remedy in as much as the consortium disturbed by the
acts is not necessarily localized in the married couple's
common, bedroom. It thus rejected the lower court's
rationale that the situs of the domicile is the only place
where injury can be sustained and that the law of the
marital domicile should therefore govern.
For a case reaching the same result see Gordon v.
Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D.C. Mass. 1949). See also RE-
STATmEN, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 377; RESTATEMENT,
TORTS (1934) § 683; 27 Am. Jur., Husband and Wife,
§§ 519-534; 36 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1951); 62 Harv. L. Rev.
1065 (1949); 1 Stan. L. Rev. 759 (1,949); 19 Tul. L. Rev. 4
(1944); 41 Mich. L. Rev. 83 (1942). Cf. Adams v. Adams,
101 Md. 506, 61 A. 628 (1905).
Constitutional Law - Maryland Statutes Requiring
Segregation Of Races In State Training Schools For
Juvenile Delinquents Declared Unconstitutional. Myers v.
State Board of Public Welfare, et al., Daily Record, July
11, 1960 (Md. 1960). Plaintiff, a thirteen-year old Negro,
upon being adjudged delinquent in the Circuit Court of
Baltimore City, Division for Juvenile Causs, contended
in a later proceeding before the same court that the Mary-
land statutes segregating the State Training Schools, 3
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MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, §§ 657, 659-661, violated the Equal
Protection and the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although the parties agreed that the tangible
facilities of these separate schools were equal, the Court
held that such segregation violated the constitutional
guarantees of equal protection and due process. The Court
applied the rationale of Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), which held that segregation in public
education violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Court said that the legislative
intent in founding Maryland's Training Schools, combined
with their present policies of administration, primarily
geared the institutions toward educational objectives rather
than toward custody and thus brought them within the
scope of public education as set forth in the Brown case.
It thus distinguished Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721
(D.C. Cal. 1959), appeal dismissed 361 U.S. 6 (1959), which
ruled that the Brown case did not extend to state penal
institutions.
In the instant case it was noted that fourteen southern
states had segregated training schools while of the remain-
ing thirty-six states, only four, including Maryland, still
maintained segregated training schools. For further analy-
sis of this area see 15 Md. L. Rev. 221 (1955); 103 A.L.R.
706 (1936); 38 A.L.R. 2d 1180 (1954).
Criminal Law - The Diminished Responsibility Doc-
trine. State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P. 2d 312 (1960).
Defendant, a mental defective, was convicted of first de-
gree murder. This conviction was reversed on appeal, the
Supreme Court of New Mexico holding that a disease of
the mind, short of insanity, can legally prevent a person
from being capable of 'that deliberation and premeditation
necessary to constitute murder in the first degree. The
court applied the much disputed partial or diminished
responsibility doctrine, under which proof of mental dis-
order short of insanity is admissible to negative specific
intent. Under this doctrine, although the homicide de-
fendant is not classified insane, the offense is reduced from
first to second degree murder.
A majority of states still rely solely upon the M'Naghten
test under which a person is legally sane if at the time of
the offense he had the capacity to distinguish between right
and wrong, and understand the nature and consequences of
his act. Maryland adopted this test in Spencer v. State,
69 Md. 28, 13 A. 809 (1888). States which support the
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diminished responsibility doctrine contend that the
M'Naghten test often renders mentally deranged persons
subject to full punishment. The doctrine does not purport
to abolish the recognized legal tests for insanity, but rather
to supplement their application in cases involving a re-
quirement of specific intent. There are two reasons com-
monly advanced in justification of the doctrine. First,
it is considered unjust to spare the voluntary drunkard on
the basis of incapacity to form a specific intent which is
an element of the offense, as is done in most of the cases,
see HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw (2d ed.
1960) 52-55, and yet to condemn the person suffering from
a mental disorder having the same effect. Second, the
doctrine keeps mentally disordered persons under guard, of
law where they might otherwise be turned loose in bor-
derline cases. Twelve states, including New Mexico, 'have
adopted the diminished responsibility doctrine, while a few
others, although indicating possible adherence to it, have
not taken a clear stand. WEIHOFEN, MENAL DISORDER AS A
CRIMINAL DEFENSE (1954) 174-195. A.L.I., MODEL PENAL
CODE, (Tent. Draft No. 4) § 402(1), adopts the rule. A
related doctrine of diminished responsibility was adopted
for England and Wales in 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 38 (Homicide Act,
1957), s. 101.
Although there were indications in Spencer v. State,
supra, that Maryland would not be adverse to adopting the
diminished responsibility doctrine, later decisions reveal
Maryland's reluctance to supplement the M'Naghten test.
Cole v. State, 212 Md. 55, 128 A. 2d 437 (1957); Bryant v.
State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A. 2d 502 (1955); Taylor v. State,
187 Md. 306, 49 A. 2d'787 (1946). For further discussion in
this area see Weihofen, Partial Insanity and Criminal In-
tent, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 505 (1930); and 30 Harv. L. Rev. 535,
552-554 (1917). Generally, See Thomsen, Insanity as a
Defense to Crime, 19 Md. L. Rev. 271 (1959); 17 Md. L.
Rev. 178 (1957); 15 Md. L. Rev. 255 (1955); 15 Md. L. Rev.
44 (1955); 45 A.L.R. 2d- 1447 (1956).
Damages - A Court Sitting Without A Jury May
Choose Between Different Measures Of Ex Contractu
Recovery Where Plaintiff Fails To Make Election. Petro-
poulos v. Lubienski, 220 Md. 293, 152 A. 2d 801 (1959).
Upon failure of the defendant-landowner to allow plaintiff-
builder to complete work contracted for, defendant's re-
fusal to pay for certain "extras", and defendant's rejec-
tion of arbitration award, plaintiff sought damages under
19601
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the theory of breach of contract as well as under claim of
quantum meruit for value of services performed, outlays
for materials furnished, and work done. At the completion
of the testimony plaintiff made no election between his
claims and the trial court, sitting without a jury, allowed
recovery on the basis of quantum meruit. The Maryland
Court of Appeals held, in light of plaintiff's failure to
choose, that there was no reason why the trial eourt could
not select the measure of damages to be applied to arrive
at a judgment according to the evidence so long as only
one measure of damages was used.
Although expressly stating that it was not deciding the
point, the Court noted that the rule permitting joinder
of causes of actions, MD. RuLE 313a, apparently requires
no election between theories at the close of all the evidence
when the court is trier of the facts. The Court of Appeals
spoke similarly in Kirchner v. Allied Contractors, 213 Md.
31, 131 A. 2d 251 (1957).
Under FED. RULE 18a, upon which the Maryland joinder
rule is patterned, a plaintiff having two consistent, con-
current, or cumulative theories which can be urged with-
out prejudice to the defendant's ability to defend is not
required to choose between the theories; "... relief must
not be denied through the vehicle of forced election.."
Senter v. B. F. Goodrich Company, 127 F. Supp. 705, 708
(D.C. Colo. 1954). In accord, Griswold v. Dixie Foundry
Co., 79 F. Supp. 79 (D.C. Tenn. 1948).
Domestic Relations - Presumption Against Awarding
Custody Of Minor Child To Adulterous Parent Not Over-
come. Parker v. Parker, 222 Md. 69, 158 A. 2d 607 (1960).
The lower court granted an absolute divorce to the wife on
the ground of three years' voluntary separation and
awarded her custody of their eight year old son. The evi-
dence showed that prior to this action, the wife had lived
in open adultery with her paramour for over a year. The
chancellor felt, however, that the wife was sincerely re-
pentant, that she would be a devoted mother, and that the
welfare of the child would best be served by allowing her
to retain custody. In reversing the ruling of the chan-
cellor as to the custody award, the Court of Appeals held
that the presumption against awarding custody to the wife,
who had lived in open adultery while the child remained
with her in the home, was not overconme -by the evidence.
The fact that the wife had married the paramour after
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the divorce .decree became final was said to be not con-
trolling in deciding the right to custody of the child.
Whatever result is reached in such cases is at least
purportedly based on the overriding consideration - the
best interests of the child. The adultery of a parent seeking
custody is merely one factor in, determining such best in-
terests. The question is whether the presence of such
a factor in a particular case is to be taken as almost con-
clusively showing that it would not be in the child's best
interest to live with the adulterous parent.
There is a strong tendency in Maryland to refuse to
permit children to be awarded to or remain with a mother
who has been guilty of adultery. Swoyer v. Swoyer, 157
Md. 18, 145 A. 190 (1929). Usually, the courts do not con-
sider an adulterous mother to be a proper person to have
custody, and a strong showing must be made to overcome
the usual presumption against awarding custody to her.
Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 157 A. 2d 442 (1960); 2 NELsON,
DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT (2d ed. 1945) § 15:06. Maryland
reached an unusual result in Oliver v. Oliver, 217 Md. 222,
140 A. 2d 908 (1958), noted in 19 Md. L. Rev. 61 (1959),
where the Court of Appeals, in upholding an award of
custody of a three year old daughter to the adulterous
mother, decided that the mother -had changed her previous
way of living and repented her past indiscretions, and
had thereby become a competent parent. See also Trudeau
v. Trudeau, 204 Md. 214, 103 A. 2d 563 (1954).
In the instant case, the Court relied on the majority
opinion in Hild v. Hild, supra, where on a similar set of
facts it was held (3-2) that the presumption against
awarding custody of a seven year old boy to his adulterous
mother was not overcome. For a discussion of the Mary-
land cases in this area, see 19 Md. L. Rev. 61 (1959).
Motor Vehicles - Failure To Remove Ignition Key
From Unattended Automobile. Liberto v. Holfeldt, 221 Md.
62, 155 A. 2d 698 (1959). In violation of 6 MD. CoDE (1957)
Art. 66 , § 247, defendant left her car unattended, with
the key in the ignition switch. The vehicle was stolen
shortly thereafter. Five days later, and at a considerable
distance across the city of Baltimore, the car was involved
in an accident with plaintiff's car. The Court of Appeals,
resolving the questions of proximate cause and independent
intervening cause on the basis of proximity in time and
space to the owner's negligent conduct, held, as a matter
of law, that defendant's violation of the motor vehicle
19601 379
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
statute was not the proximate cause of the accident, and
that the subsequent negligence of the thief was an inde-
pendent intervening cause precluding recovery against de-
fendant. The Court pointed out that while the issues of
foreseeability and proximate cause are normally for the
jury, they may be resolved as a matter of law when rea-
sonable minds could reach only one conclusion.
The case is one of first impression in Maryland. In
Hochschild, Kohn & Co. v. Canoles, 193 Md. 276, 66 A. 2d
780 (1949), noted 11 Md. L. Rev. 51 (1950), defendant
violated the second clause of Art. 66 , § 247, which re-
quires setting of the brake and turning the front wheels to
the curb whenever a vehicle is left standing on a per-
ceptible grade. This was considered evidence of negligence
rendering defendant liable in tort to the plaintiff, who was
injured by defendant's runaway truck. In Maryland, the
violation of a statute normally creates a prima facie pre-
sumption of negligence and is not considered to be negli-
gence per se. Kelly v. Huber Baking Co., 145 Md. 321, 125
A. 782 (1924).
The area is analyzed in a Note, Liability for Negligence
in Parking - Effect of Statute, 11 Md. L. Rev. 51 (1950).
See RESTATmamET, ToRrs (1934), §§ 447 and 448; M.L.E.
Automobiles § § 16, 131, 250. Cases are collected in 51 A.L.R.
2d 633 (1957).
Practice - Motion To Vacate Decree Does Not In It-
self Toll The Thirty-Day Appeal Period. Monumental
Engineering, Inc. v. Simon, 221 Md. 548, 158 A. 2d 471
(1960). The decree of the equity court was filed on Sep-
tember 25, 1959, and enrolled on October 25, 1959. On
October 19, 1959, appellant filed a motion to vacate the
decree and for a reconsideration thereof. No order to
suspend the operation and effect of the decree was sought
by appellant. The motion to vacate the decree was over-
ruled on November 6, 1959, and this appeal was filed No-
vember 30, 1959. Appellant contended that its motion to
vacate the decree tolled the running of the thirty-day
appeal period fixed by Mn. Rui 812a. The Court of Appeals
rejected appellant's contention and held that a motion to
vacate a decree does not in itself toll the running of the
thirty-day appeal period. Since no special order had been
passed by the lower court suspending the operation of the
decree before it became enrolled, the thirty-day period
had expired and the claim was dismissed.
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Prior to MD. RULE 812a there were inconsistencies
within the statutes and rules relating to the time for tak-
ing appeals. An interesting discussion may be found in
Invernizzi and Kaiser, A Study - Conflicts Between
Statutes and Rules as to Time for Appeals, 11 Md. L. Rev.
325 (1950). The purpose of MiD. RULE 812a is to harmonize
the rules and statutes and to eliminate the inconsistencies.
The rule provides that whenever an appeal is permitted by
law, the order for appeal shall be filed within thirty days
from the date of the judgment. This makes the time for
appeal uniform in all cases, except where it is from a court
of law to which issues have been sent for trial from an
equity or an Orphans' Court. In those instances, if a
timely motion for a new trial is filed, the order for appeal
shall be filed, within thirty days from the date such motion
is d ided. MID. RuLE 812b. It is to be noted, however,
that in a case at law, a motion for a new trial must be
made within three days of a verdict in a jury case, and in
the case of a trial by the court or of a special verdict,
within three days after the entry of a judgment nisi.
MD. RULE 567a. If no such motion is made within the
time prescribed, a final judgment is entered. Mi. Ru=
567e. The thirty-day appeal period commences to run only
upon the entry of a final judgment.
Other Maryland cases indicating that a petition for
rehearing or a motion to vacate a decree in an, equity pro-
ceeding does not in itself toll the thirty-day appeal period
and that a decree may be suspended only by a special
order, include Hanley v. Stulman, 216 Md,. 461, 141 A. 2d
167 (1958); Riviere v. Quinlan, 210 Md. 76, 122 A. 2d 332
(1956); Hancock v. Stull, 199 Md. 434, 86 A. 2d 734 (1952);
Jacobs v. Bealmear, 41 Md. 484 (1874). See also M.L.E.
Appeals §§ 182-184.
1960]
